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THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY
TO END MASS INCARCERATION
Angela J Davis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Of the many crises in our criminal justice system, none is more
critical than the problem of mass incarceration. The United States has
the highest incarceration rate in the world, with over 2.2 million people
in prison or jail and 4.7 million on probation and parole. 1 Making up
only five percent of the world's population, the United States
incarcerates more than twenty percent of the world's prisoners.2
Over ten years ago, Justice Anthony Kennedy gave a major address
at the American Bar Association ("ABA") Annual Meeting in which he
decried the overuse of incarceration and the harsh penalties that result in
extraordinarily lengthy prison terms. According to Justice Kennedy,
"[o]ur resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences
too long." 3 He went on to say, "I can accept neither the necessity nor
the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences. In too many
cases, mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust." 4 Justice
Kennedy urged the bar to come up with solutions:
In seeking to improve our corrections system, the Bar can use the full

diversity of its talents. Those of you in civil practice who have
expertise in coordinating groups, finding evidence, and influencing
government policies have great potential to help find more just

solutions and more humane policies for those who are the least
* Angela J. Davis is a Professor of Law at American University Washington College of
Law and a former Director of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. She thanks
Shawnta Albro and Layla Medina for their excellent research assistance.
1. NICOLE D. PORTER, SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2014:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2015).
2. The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis (last visited July 24, 2016).

3. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003).
4. Id.
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deserving of our citizens, but citizens nonetheless. A decent and free
society, founded in respect for the individual, ought not to run a system
with a sign at the entrance
for inmates saying, "Abandon Hope, All Ye
5
Who Enter Here."
More recently, former Attorney General Eric Holder made criminal
justice reform one of his highest priorities. From the beginning of his
tenure as Attorney General in 2009, when he announced a review of the
U.S. Department of Justice ("Justice Department") charging and
sentencing policies, to his farewell speech before he stepped down in
2015, Holder consistently spoke out against harsh sentencing policies
resulting in the nation's extraordinarily high prison population and
unwarranted racial disparities.6 Similar to Justice Kennedy, he addressed
the ABA stating that "[t]oo many people go to too many prisons for far
too long and for no truly good law enforcement reason"7 before going on
to announce sweeping reforms in the federal system.8
Perhaps, the strongest evidence that the prison population has
reached a point of crisis is the recent effort of conservative and liberal
policymakers to pursue criminal justice reform. In an unusual showing
of bipartisanship, republican and democratic legislators have formed a
coalition to pass legislation that would lessen penalties for some crimes,
with the goal of reducing the prison population.9 Congressmen as far
apart on most issues as Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Rand Paul
have worked together to propose bipartisan legislation to reduce lengthy
sentences for many federal crimes) °
This Article argues that prosecutors have an ethical duty to take
action that significantly reduces the incarceration rate in the United
States. i t Reducing mass incarceration will require a multifaceted
approach, but prosecutors are uniquely situated to have the greatest and
most immediate impact on this problem because of their Vast discretion
and power. Part II examines the criminal justice policies, practices, and

5.

Id. at 7.

6.

See Angela J. Davis, Eric Holder Transformed the Attorney General into an Advocate for

the Poor, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 26, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/119616/eric-holderscriminial-justice-legacy.
7. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013).
8. See id.
9. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
10. See Rand Paul & Patrick Leahy, Join Us to Do Away with Mandatory Minimums, U.S.
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-eric-holder-making-a-

good-move-on-mandatory-minimums/rand-paul-and-patrick-leahy-congress-is-read-to-do-awaywith-mandatory-minimums.
11.

See infra Part IV.
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laws that produced the current crisis. 12 Part III discusses the power and
discretion of prosecutors and how their charging and plea bargaining
practices have contributed to the crisis of mass incarceration." Part IV
argues that prosecutors have an ethical duty to take action to
significantly reduce the incarceration rate.14 Part V describes two
projects that prosecutors should implement and support: diversion
programs for all nonviolent felonies and clemency programs for
prisoners who no longer pose a danger to society. 5
II.

THE CRISIS OF MASS INCARCERATION

With 2.2 million people in America's prisons and jails, the United
States has the dubious distinction of having the highest incarceration rate
in the world, which is five to eight times greater than all other liberal
democracies in the world.16 The number of federal prisoners alone has
grown by eight hundred percent during the past three decades.17 There
are several reasons for this drastic increase in the incarceration rate,
including the war on drugs, the passage of harsh sentencing guidelines,
and numerous mandatory minimum sentencing laws at the federal and
state level.
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration declared a war on
drugs.' 8 Nancy Reagan introduced her "Just Say No" campaign, and the
administration launched a law enforcement strategy that resulted in an
exponential increase in federal prisoners and unprecedented racial
disparities in the prison population.19 In 1982, Congress authorized
twelve new regional drug task forces that included over one thousand
new FBI and DEA agents and federal prosecutors.2 ' Federal drug
prosecutions increased by ninety-nine percent between 1982 and 1988.21
Congress passed harsh sentencing laws that drastically increased
the penalties for a number of drug offenses. These laws included
mandatory minimum terms with no possibility of release before the

12. See infra Part 11.
13. See infra Part IlI.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, STATEMENT TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON "THE STATE OF CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES" 1 (2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/1 1/rdStatement forSJC Hearing_
on-Civil
17.
18.
19.

and HumanRightsin the U.S._Dec 2014.pdf.
Id.
See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 60 (2d ed. 2006).
See id. at 60-61.

20. Id. at 61.
21. Id.
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minimum term is completed.22 Judges are required to sentence any
person convicted of one of these crimes to at least the mandatory term,
regardless of the particular circumstances of the crime or the defendant's
criminal history." Consequently, first-time offenders and individuals
who played a minor role in the commission of the offense have been and
continue to be sentenced to long prison terms.24
One factor that contributed to the passage of these laws was the
emergence of crack cocaine. This inexpensive form of cocaine was
marketed widely in low-income, predominantly African American
neighborhoods in the inner cities.2 The media reported and perpetuated
information about crack cocaine that ultimately was proven to be
false. Crack was perceived to be a much more dangerous drug
than powder cocaine, leading to reports that the children of users of
crack-so-called "crack babies"-would develop severe mental and
physical disabilities.26 It was also reported that crack was more addictive
than powder cocaine, and it caused its users to become violent.27 All
these myths were ultimately proven to be false.2 8
In 1986, well-known University of Maryland basketball star Len
Bias died of a drug overdose.2 9 In the midst of the media frenzy over
crack cocaine, it was falsely reported that Bias had died from a crack
overdose.3" Bias was one of the biggest stars in college basketball. The
Boston Celtics had drafted him shortly before he died.3 1 Congress
responded to this high-profile death by quickly passing the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986.32 This law created five- and ten-year mandatory
minimum prison terms for first-time drug dealers.3 3 The length of
the mandatory minimum term would depend on the type and quantity
22. See id. at 62.
23. See KARA GOTSCH, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC'Y FOR LAW & POLICY, "AFTER" THE WAR
ON DRUGS: THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT AND THE UNFINISHED DRUG POLICY REFORM AGENDA 2

(2011), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Gotsch_-_After-the War-onDrugs_0.pdf.
24. See id. at 2-3.
25. Id. at 3-4.
26. Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 3, 2010, 1:52 PM), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126478643.
27. Id.
28. See DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CiviL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS
IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW 5 (2006)

(dispelling all the common myths about crack cocaine); Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later, supra
note 26.
29. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 28, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id. At the time of Bias's death, the Speaker of the House of Representatives was Tip
O'Neill, who was from Boston. MAUER, supranote 18, at 62.
32. See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supranote 28, at 1.
33. Id. at 2.
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of the drug.34 The law was passed swiftly, with no reports of its
impact on communities or the prison population.35 Congress even
bypassed the committee hearings that ordinarily accompany the passage
36
of legislation.
Most notably, there was no study or evaluation of the propriety of
one of the most controversial components of the law-the one hundred
to one disparity between the penalties for crack and powder cocaine
offenses.3 7 Congressmen made conclusory statements about the
dangerousness of crack cocaine to justify the penalty disparity.38 Various
congressmen stated that crack led to the commission of more serious
crimes, it was more addictive, and young people were more prone to use
it.39 These and other conclusory statements were made without any
supporting evidence to justify the stark disparity.4"
Two years later, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 that ratcheted up the penalties for drug offenses even more.41 This
law expanded the same mandatory minimum penalties to drug
conspiracies and attempts.42 It also made crack cocaine the only drug
with a mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession, even for firsttime offenders.4 3
These harsh mandatory minimum sentencing laws were passed
around the same time period that Congress took on a major overhaul of
federal sentencing with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984." This law created the U.S. Sentencing Commission-an
independent agency charged with creating sentencing guidelines to
establish uniformity in sentencing.4 5 Members of both political parties
complained that there was too much disparity in the sentences imposed
by federal judges. At the time, the general consensus was that guidelines
that created a system of determinate sentencing would resolve this

34. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 110-39 (1995).
35. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 28, at 2.
36. Spencer A. Stone, Note, FederalDrug Sentencing- What Was Congress Smoking? The
Uncertain Distinction Between "Cocaine" and "Cocaine Base" in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 297, 315-16 (2007).
37.

VAGrNS &MCCURDY, supra note 28, at 2.

38. Stone, supra note 36, at 336-41.
39. Id.
40.

See VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 28, at 2.

41. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 34, at 116.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
45. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supranote 34, at 115.
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problem.46 Adopted in 1987, the guidelines were published in a complex
845-page manual, which indicated a narrow range of months within
which judges were required to sentence defendants based solely on the
offense and the defendant's criminal history.47
The federal sentencing guidelines failed to achieve their stated
goal. Not only did the disparities continue, but they worsened.48 The
guidelines did not eliminate discretion; they simply transferred it from
judges to prosecutors. Federal judges complained that they were required
to impose sentences that were unfair.4 9 Most of the sentencing ranges
were exceptionally high, and there were very few offenses for which
probation was permitted.5" In addition, judges could no longer take into
account mitigating circumstances when sentencing an individual. Some
made speeches from the bench before sentencing an individual, stating
that they did not want to impose a particular sentence but were required
to do so by the guidelines.5 1
The federal war on drugs inspired most states to follow suit. Many
states passed harsh mandatory minimum sentencing laws-some harsher
than the federal laws. 52 Twenty-two states also established sentencing
commissions and sentencing guidelines.53 As a result, the federal and
54
state prison populations exploded.

46. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8, 13 (1991).
47. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
1987).
48. See Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Why Did Racial/Ethnic Sentencing
Differences in FederalDistrict Courts Grow Larger Under the Guidelines?, 6 FED. SENT'G REP.
223,223 (1994).
49. David G. Savage, Justices OK Latitude on Sentencing, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/11/nation/na-scotusl 1.
50. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Bl.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2013);
Guidefor Users, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRO. 1, 710-13 (2005).
51. See Gary Cohn, More Judges Balking at MandatoryDrug Sentences They Say the Federal
Law Is Unfair. And Some Refuse to Hear Drug Cases, PHILLY (June 20, 1993), http://articles.
philly.com/1993-06-20/news/25972935_lfederal-sentencing-laws-drug-cases-drug-sentences;
see
also Carrie Johnson & Marisa Peflaloza, Judge Regrets Harsh Human Toll of Mandatory Minimum
Sentences, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 17, 2014, 3:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/16/
370991710/judge-regrets-harsh-human-toll-of-mandatory-minimum-sentences (explaining a federal
judge's distaste for mandatory minimum sentences in certain instances).
52. See Gotsch, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that Missouri adopted a seventy-five to one
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, and Oklahoma set a six to one quantitybased sentencing disparity that required a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for possessing five
grams of crack cocaine and twenty-eight grams of powder cocaine).
53. See About NASC, NAT'L ASS'N SENT'G COMM'NS, http://thenasc.org/aboutnasc.html (last
visited July 24, 2016).
54. See Gotsch, supra note 23, at 3.
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In 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act.55 This law authorized billions of dollars
for states to build more prisons contingent upon the states passing
so-called "Truth-in-Sentencing" laws, which reduced prisoners'
eligibility for parole.56 The law also expanded the federal death penalty
and created mandatory life sentences for individuals convicted of a third
violent felony.57
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing
guidelines were no longer mandatory,58 and in recent years, there have
been efforts to reform the federal and state laws. On the federal level, the
effort was led by the Sentencing Commission itself, which issued a
series of reports urging crack cocaine sentencing policy reform. The
commission was successful in achieving a reduction in the guidelines
range for crack offenses in 2007, but the harsh mandatory minimum
sentences imposed by Congress remained. 59 Finally, in 2010, the Fair
Sentencing Act was passed, reducing the one hundred to one disparity
for crack offense to eighteen to one.6" Subsequent amendments made the
law partially retroactive, permitting some defendants to file motions
requesting a reduction.6"
Most recently, a bipartisan group of senators introduced legislation
to further reverse the harsh sentencing laws passed during the 1980s.
The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act would grant broad
authority to federal judges to exempt a substantial number of nonviolent
drug offenders from mandatory minimum prison terms.62 Other parts of
the Act would allow it to apply retroactively for many more prisoners.63
The Sentencing Commission announced that, ultimately, up to 46,000 of
the nation's 100,000 drug offenders in federal prison may qualify for

55. Carrie Johnson, 20 Years Later, Parts of Major Crime Bill Viewed as Terrible Mistake,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/347736999/20-

years-later-maj or-crime-bill-viewed-as-terrible-mistake.
56. Fact Sheet. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., https://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt (last visited July 24, 2016).

57.
58.

Id.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).

59. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010, at 3, 5, 7 (2015).

TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT

OF THE FAIR

60. Id. at 7.
61.

See Final Crack Retroactivity Data Report Fair Sentencing Act, U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivityanalyses/fair-sentencing-act/FinalUSSCCrack_Retro Data ReportFSA.pdf.
62. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
63. Id.; Mike Riggs, House Judiciary Committee Approves Sentencing Reform and
CorrectionsAct, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://famm.org/

house-judiciary-committee-approves-sentencing-reform-and-corrections-act.
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early release.' Many of the states have been even more proactive
than the federal government in reforming sentencing laws. Between
2009 and 2013, forty states took some action to reduce the penalties for
drug offenses.65
These efforts are promising, but there are still 2.2 million people in
the nation's prisons and jails. Despite the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Booker,66 most federal judges continue to apply the
federal sentencing guidelines.67 Thousands of prisoners sentenced under
the harsh federal and state sentencing laws enacted in the 1980s remain
68
in prison-some serving life sentences for nonviolent drug offenses.
Even if the latest proposed federal legislation is passed, it will not affect
the sentences of these prisoners.
One of the most significant consequences of sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentences was the transfer of discretion and
power from judges to prosecutors. Prosecutors already exercised great
discretion and power in the criminal justice system, but these sentencing
policies increased that power and discretion significantly, leaving no
doubt that prosecutors had become the most powerful officials in the
criminal justice system. The recent efforts to reduce the prison
population do not address the enhanced power of prosecutors. However,
the mass incarceration crisis cannot be resolved without a change in
prosecutorial practices.
III.

THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE IN THE MASS INCARCERATION CRISIS

A.

Chargingand PleaBargaining

Prosecutors have played a significant role in the crisis of mass
incarceration. The tough laws that established lengthy and mandatory
minimum prison terms gave prosecutors the tools to fill the nation's
prisons and jails. None of these laws required prosecutors to charge

64. See Erik Eckholm, Thousands Start Life Anew with Early Prison Release, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2015, at A10.
65. Drew Desilver, Feds May Be Rethinking the Drug War, but States Have Been Leading the
Way, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/02/feds-maybe-rethinking-the-drug-war-but-states-have-been-leading-the-way.
66. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); see also supra text accompanying note 58.

67. U.S.

SENT'G COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.

BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 3, 5 (2012) (noting that the guidelines have continued to
significantly influence sentences for most offenses); see also Dan Honold, Note, Quantity, Role, and
Culpabilityin the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 392 (2014).
68. Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 227, 295-96 (2015).
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every individual at the highest possible level or even to charge at all, but
69
far too many of them did.
A prosecutor decides whether to charge an individual with a
crime and what the charge or charges should be. A police officer
may arrest an individual if she has probable cause to believe the
individual committed a crime, but she may only recommend that the
prosecutor bring charges. The final charging decision belongs solely to
the prosecutor.7 0
The prosecutor may charge an individual if she has probable cause
to believe that the individual has committed a crime.71 She may charge
the defendant with the crime or crimes recommended by the police or
with more or less serious crimes.72 Or, the prosecutor may forego
charges altogether, even if there is probable cause (or even proof beyond
a reasonable doubt).73 The decision to charge or decline charges is
74
totally within the discretion of the prosecutor.
The plea bargaining process is also totally controlled by the
prosecutor. 75 As with charges, a prosecutor may offer a plea bargain to a
defendant but is not required to do SO. 7 6 A judge may not compel a
prosecutor to offer a plea-the decision is made solely by the
prosecutor. 77 Since ninety-five percent of all criminal cases are resolved
with a guilty plea,78 the prosecutor's control over charging and plea
bargaining decisions gives her the power to control the entire criminal
justice system.
When Congress passed the federal sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentencing laws, it increased the power of
prosecutors even more. Congress' concern about the discretion that
produced disparities in sentences did not result in the elimination of
discretion. Instead, discretion was transferred from judges to
prosecutors-from judges who imposed sentences in open, public
courtrooms to prosecutors who made charging and plea bargaining
decisions behind closed doors. The vast discretion that prosecutors

69. See, e.g., infra notes 83-124 and accompanying text.
70.

See ANGELA J. DAvIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR

23 (2007).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. at 43.
76. Id. at 43-46.
77. Id.

78. Jenny Roberts, Too Little Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, andPretrialDiscovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FoRDHAM UR. L.J. 1097, 1136 (2004).

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1063

previously exercised was enhanced and centralized by guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentencing laws.
In the federal system, the charging and plea bargaining decisions
are particularly significant. Federal sentencing laws require very lengthy
prison terms, and before the Booker decision, the guidelines were
mandatory.79 Many crimes carry lengthy mandatory minimum terms in
addition to sentences required by the guidelines.8" A judge was required
to impose mandatory minimum terms and could only sentence outside
the guidelines if the prosecutor filed a "substantial assistance" motion
under section 5K1.1.1 That section of the guidelines permitted a judge
to depart from the guidelines if the prosecutor stated that the defendant
had provided "substantial assistance" to the government in the
82
investigation of the criminal behavior of someone else.
Since prosecutors only need meet the low standard of probable
cause to bring charges, it is relatively easy for them to "pile on"
charges that they may not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
at trial. A defendant facing multiple charges with mandatory minimum
and lengthy prison terms would, not surprisingly, feel compelled to
accept the prosecutor's offer to plead guilty to one or more of the
charges in exchange for the prosecutor's offer to dismiss the remaining
charges. The deal might include an agreement to testify against another
defendant to reduce the sentence even more. Defendants who chose to
exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial often suffered extremely
harsh consequences.
Clarence Aaron was one such defendant. Aaron grew up in a
housing project in Mobile, Alabama.8 3 Despite growing up in a high
crime neighborhood, Aaron managed to avoid the pitfalls and remained
crime-free, ultimately enrolling in Southern University.84 While in
college, he made a bad decision. He introduced an old high school friend
to a college classmate whose brother was a drug dealer.8" Aaron was
present during a drug transaction and received $1500 for his role in the

79. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
80. These are commonly referred to in the Sentencing Guidelines as "Upward Departure
Provisions," in which the crime is of such a nature or committed in such a way as to allow for
additional sentencing. See, e.g., Honold, supranote 67, at 394-96.
81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2013); Julie
Gyurci, Note, ProsecutorialDiscretionto Bring a SubstantialAssistance Motion Pursuantto a Plea
Agreement: Enforcing a Good FaithStandard,78 MNN. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (1994).
82. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI1.
83.

Clarence Aaron, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, http://famm.org/clarence-

aaron (last visited July 24, 2016).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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deal. 6 He was charged with conspiracy to possess a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to distribute, and attempt to possess a controlled substance with
intent to distribute.87
Clarence Aaron went to trial and was convicted of all charges.
Aaron, a first-time, nonviolent offender, was sentenced to three life
sentences without the possibility of parole-just for introducing
someone to a drug dealer.88 Others who played a much more significant
role in the drug transaction agreed to plead guilty and testify against
Aaron.89 They all received much more lenient sentences. One coconspirator who testified that he was a major drug dealer and had made
over a million dollars was sentenced to fourteen years but only served
seven years and ten months.9 ° The high school friend was sentenced to
ten years but only served four.91 The drug kingpin who played the most
significant role was sentenced to life, but his sentence was reduced to
twenty-four years, and he was expected to be released in 2014.92 Aaron's
role in the drug transaction was the least significant, but he was
sentenced to the most time-more time than most violent repeat
offenders.93 President Obama finally commuted his sentence, but not
before he had served twenty years in federal prison.9 4
Defendants who accept the prosecutor's plea offers are also often
subject to long, unfair sentences. Such was the plight of Kemba Smith.
Like Clarence Aaron, Kemba Smith was a college student.95 She grew
up in a middle class home in Richmond, Virginia, before attending
Hampton University.96 Smith met Peter Hall during her sophomore year.
Hall was a major drug dealer and eight years older than Smith.97 Hall
brutally beat Smith throughout the relationship, and she tried to leave
86. Adriano Hrvatin, Comment, UnconstitutionalExploitation of DelegatedAuthority: How
to Deter Prosecutors from Using "Substantial Assistance" to Defeat the Intent of Federal
Sentencing Laws, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 117, 123 (2002).

87.
88.
89.

United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 306 (11th Cir. 1996).
See Hrvatin, supra note 86, at 125.
Id. at 123-24.

90. Jennifer Lawinski, Locked up for Life, Part One: The Case of Clarence Aaron, Fox
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/12/04/locked-up-for-life-part-one-case-

clarence-aaron.html.
91.

Id.

92. Id.
93. See Adam Serwer, Obama Commutes Clarence Aaron's Sentence, MSNBC (Dec. 19,
2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-rights-decades-old-injustice#49291.

94. Id.
95.

See Kemba Smith, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/feature.cfm?

feature id=I (last visited July 24, 2016).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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him on several occasions.98 He insisted that she help him, and she was
too afraid to say no.9 9 Hall was a dangerous drug dealer who had killed a
man he suspected of cooperating with federal investigators."' ° Hall told
Smith about the murder and even suggested that he suspected Smith's
father might be cooperating with federal agents."' 1 Smith was terrified
and did whatever Hall told her to do.1" 2 She ultimately was indicted
along with Hall and other alleged co-conspirators. 0 3
While some of her co-defendants cut deals with the prosecutors,
Smith remained loyal to Hall.1" By the time she finally decided to
cooperate, Hall had been murdered, and the prosecutors were no longer
interested in making a deal."15 On advice of counsel, Smith pled guilty to
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to
engage in money -laundering, and making false statements to a federal
agent. 10 6 Her lawyer told her that the government would ask for a
reduced sentence, and she expected a sentence of about five years.10 7
Instead, she was sentenced to 24.5 years in prison.10 8 She was seven
months pregnant at the time. 109 Fortunately for Smith, President Clinton
commuted her sentence after she served 6.5 years.11 0
Similar to Clarence Aaron, Kemba Smith was a nonviolent, firsttime offender whose role in the drug conspiracy was minor.11 The
prosecutors conceded that she never handled or sold drugs.112 However,
Smith did carry large sums of money for Hall, and she was in a van with
him that carried large amounts of cocaine. 1 3 She also lied to a federal
agent. 114 For these actions, she was sentenced to 24.5 years in prison. As
in Aaron's case, Smith's alleged co-conspirators were offered much

98. Id.; see also Nekima Levy-Pounds, Beaten by the System and Down for the Count: Why
Poor Women of Color and Children Don't Stand a Chance Against U.S. Drug-Sentencing Policy, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 469 (2006).
99. See Kemba Smith, supra note 95.
100. See Libby Copeland, Kemba Smith's Hard Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46891-2000Feb 13.html.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Levy-Pounds, supranote 98, at 468-70.
Id. at470-71.
Seeid. at473.
Id. at 472-73.
Copeland, supra note 100.
Id.
Levy-Pounds, supranote 98, at 470; see also Kemba Smith, supra note 95.
Kemba Smith, supra note 95.
Id.
Id.
Levy-Pounds, supra note 98, at 470-71.
Copeland, supra note 100.

114.

Id.
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better deals. Some escaped prosecution altogether because they
cooperated with the prosecutors, providing information against other
was not
defendants. 1 ' The woman who helped Hall commit the murder
6
charged at all and was put in the witness protection program.' 1
The stories of Clarence Aaron and Kemba Smith are unusual
only because they were both fortunate to have their sentences
commuted. The sentences they received are not unusual. There are
thousands of federal prisoners still serving lengthy sentences for
nonviolent drug offenses117- m a n y are first offenders. 18 Commutations
are rare, and recent efforts to expedite the pardon process have been
2015, President Obama had only
unsuccessful." 9 As of December
1 20
commuted 184 sentences.
The prosecutors in Aaron's and Smith's cases did not have to
charge them with offenses that require such lengthy prison terms. They
chose to do so, and it is difficult to ascertain why. Neither of them was a
major drug dealer or even sold drugs at all. Yet, they were charged with
offenses that required more prison time than many violent offenses-in
the case of Aaron, life in prison without the possibility of parole. 121 The
prosecutors in each case chose to offer deals to other defendants who
committed much more serious offenses-deals that permitted many of
them to serve relatively short periods of time in prison. In Smith's case,
some served no time at all. It is difficult to understand how these
decisions comport with fairness and justice.
Legislators pass laws, and prosecutors enforce them. However, they
have a responsibility to enforce the laws fairly. Certainly, prosecutors
should not blindly prosecute every case to the fullest extent of the law.
When legislatures pass laws, they expect prosecutors to use their

115.

Id.

116. Id.
117. See United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D. Mass. 2008) ("Indeed, the
[Sentencing] Guidelines' scoring makes no distinction between violent and nonviolent offenses:
an addict with a record of drug convictions could have a higher score than another defendant
with a murder conviction."); Offenses, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/

statistics_inmate offenses.jsp (last updated July 23, 2015) (finding that approximately forty-six
percent of inmates are charged with drug offenses).
118. See Copeland, supranote 100.
119.

See Peter Baker, Obama Plans Broader Use of Clemency to Free Nonviolent Drug

Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2015, at Al (explaining that even though President Obama is
expected to commute dozens of sentences, he will barely make a dent in the clemency applications).
120. Melanie Garunay, President Obama Has Shortened the Sentences of More People
than the Last 5 Presidents Combined, WHTE HOUSE BLOG (July 23, 2015, 1:22 PM), https://

www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/12/18/president-obama-has-shortened-sentences-more-people-last5-presidents-combined.
121. Lawinski, supra note 90.
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discretion in deciding when, whom, and how to charge. 122 Prosecutors
have vast discretion when making these decisions, and they should
exercise that discretion in ways that produce fair and just results.'2 3 As
one former prosecutor described his charging and plea bargaining
responsibilities, "'doing justice' meant seeking to achieve a 'just,'
and not necessarily the most harsh, result. 124 That same former
prosecutor stated:
[A] prosecutor may be said to have 'done justice' by not bringing
criminal charges that were legally supported by the evidence but which
would have resulted in disproportionately harsh punishment given such
considerations as the insignificance of the wrongdoing, the defendant's
25
prior exemplary conduct, or the defendant's frail physical condition. 1
B.

The Decision to PursueFelony Charges

A confluence of factors contributed to the exponential growth in the
prison population during the past few decades. 126 The passage of lengthy
and mandatory minimum sentencing laws, the war on drugs, and
prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining decisions all played a role.
However, the extent to which each of these factors contributed to prison
growth had been unclear until empirical research by Professor John Pfaff
shed significant light.
Pfaff s research demonstrates that prosecutors' charging decisions
were the single most significant factor that caused the increase in prison
admissions between 1994 and 2008.127 Pfaff s examination of data from
the National Center for State Courts and the Bureau of Justice Statistics'
State Court Processing Statistics project determined that the increase in
the prison population between 1994 and 2008 was caused primarily by
prosecutors' decisions to bring substantially more felony charges in

122. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
837, 874 (2004) ("Rarely do statutes include explicit criteria that dictate prosecutors' decisions. This
phenomenon may either be because the legislators have an expectation that prosecutors will fully
enforce the law or because the legislators wish to condemn the prohibited conduct for symbolic
reasons without forming concrete expectations regarding enforcement.").
123. See United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1433 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he prosecutor's
ethical duty is to seek the fairest rather than necessarily the most severe outcome ....").
124. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,

608 (1999).
125. Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
126. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
127. See John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations
13-14 (July 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract_
id=1884674.
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criminal cases. 128 Pfaff demonstrates that during this period, felony
arrests declined by 10.1%, but case filings rose by 37.4% and prison
admissions rose by 40%.129
Pfaff notes the need for further research to determine why felony
filings increased during this period of time. He acknowledges that
such research will be difficult because of the lack of transparency
' 130
in prosecutor offices, referring to them as "empirical black boxes."
Pfaff posits that one possible reason might be the fact that more
defendants had longer criminal records during this period of time due
to the increase in arrests and convictions between the 1960s and
early 1990s.1 31 He suggests that prosecutors might be more inclined to

bring felony charges against defendants with a lengthier criminal
record. 132 This theory may only be confirmed with further research.
Regardless of the reasons, the evidence of the dominant role that
prosecutors have played in the mass incarceration crisis is significant
and supports the suggestion that prosecutors must lead the charge in
addressing the problem.
IV.

THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY TO PURSUE JUSTICE

All lawyers are required to follow established ethical rules in the
practice of law. All states except California have adopted some version
of the ABA Model Rules ofProfessionalResponsibility.133 Lawyers who
violate any rules may be prosecuted by their state's bar counsel and face
discipline or even disbarment.
Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,"
addresses the ethical duties of prosecutors. 3 4 The first sentence of the
Comment to Rule 3.8 states, "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." 135 The Comment
imparts the same sentiment as the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Berger v. UnitedStates:
128. See id. at 26.
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 38-39 (stating individual offices and counties can gather data better to determine
prosecutorial decision-making).
131. Id. at 26 ("If prosecutors are generally more likely to file charges the longer a defendant's
record, then filings could rise during a time of declining arrests if the average record length per
arrestee is growing.").
132. Id.
133.

ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.

americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model-rules of professional cond
uct.html (last visited July 24, 2016).
134.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).

135. Id. r. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall
36
win a case, but that justice shall be done.'
In addition to the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, the
ABA has established criminal justice standards that serve as guidelines
for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and policymakers. There are separate
standards for defense attorneys and prosecutors. The standards are
aspirational, and lawyers are not disciplined or sanctioned in any way if
they do not follow them. The standards are consistent with the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility but provide guidance on a much
wider range of issues.
The same responsibility provided by the Comment to Rule 3.8 is
established under Standard 3-1.2(b) of the ABA Standardsfor Criminal
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function-the duty of prosecutors to
do justice-which states that "[t]he primary duty of the prosecutor is to
137
seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.
Standard 3-1.2(b) continues, "[t]he prosecutor serves the public interest
and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public
safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate
severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in
appropriate circumstances."'3 Standard 3-1.2(f) states as follows:
The prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also a problemsolver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal
justice system. The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve
the administration of criminal justice, and when inadequacies or
injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's
attention, the prosecutor
should stimulate and support efforts for
139
remedial action.
The Comment to Rule 3.8 and Standard 3-1.2 together charge
prosecutors with serving as both ministers and administrators of justice.
In his article, (Ad)ministeringJustice: A Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to
Support Sentencing Reform, Professor R. Michael Cassidy discusses the
difference between the two. He notes that the use of the word
"administrator" in the Prosecution Function Standards "is meaningful

136.

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

137.

ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION

AND

DEF.

FUNCTION,

Standard 3-1.2(b) (4th ed. 2015).
138. Id.
139. Id.Standard 3-1.2(f).
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and highlights the difference between pursuing justice in individual
cases as a litigator and pursuing the public interest by promoting a just
system as a government official.""14
Numerous scholars have written about the prosecutor's role as a
minister of justice in a variety of contexts. 14" ' The consistent theme is
that the prosecutor has a much broader duty than her role in the
adversarial system where she represents the government in criminal
cases, and that duty is to assure that justice is done-both in individual
cases and in the criminal justice system as a whole. The Comment to
Rule 3.8, the Prosecution Function Standards, and the Supreme Court
make it clear that prosecutors should not just seek convictions but should
pursue the broader goal of justice. Sometimes it is just to seek a
conviction, but sometimes it is not. The language in Standard 3.1-2(b)
indicating that prosecutors should exercise their discretion and not
pursue criminal charges in appropriate cases is instructive, as is the
language in Standard 3.1-2(f) urging prosecutors to consider the broader
goals of the criminal justice system, seek reform, and improve the
administration of justice.
V.

ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: TWO PROPOSALS

Cassidy, a former prosecutor, argues in (Ad)ministering Justice: A
Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing Reform that
prosecutors have an ethical duty to reform the criminal justice system as
both ministers and administers of justice. 4' He proposes that prosecutors
"oppose mandatory sentences for all but the most serious, violent,

140. R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support
Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. C-u. L.J. 981, 994 (2014).
141. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REv. 271, 296-97, 302, 313 (2013) (presenting the idea that the
criminal justice system is biased because of the prosecutor's discretion); Bennett L. Gershman, The
Prosecutoras a "Ministerof Justice, " 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 8 (1988) (stating that prosecutors are on
top of the world and their powers are constantly reinforced by legislators and the courts); Daniel S.
Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the PostConviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REv. 35, 47-58 (2009) (explaining how the minister of justice
theory of the American prosecutor translates into post-conviction work); Eli Paul Mazur, Note,
Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor's Role as a
Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1355-60 (2002) (arguing that prosecutors as ministers of
justice breach their ethical duties when they engage in implicit plea bargaining because it renders
the defendant's procedural safeguards ineffective).
142. Cassidy, supra note 140, at 995 (differentiating both roles, Cassidy states that "as an
advocate (minister), a prosecutor must temper zeal with a fidelity to truth and a commitment to fair
play," and "as a leader/governor (administrator),a prosecutor must be guided by the public interest
in promoting a fair, reliable and efficient criminal justice system worthy of confidence and
respect").
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offenses. 143 Cassidy also argues that prosecutors should implement
internal policies and guidelines in their offices to assure the fair and
even-handed exercise of discretion in the plea-bargaining process and
more thoughtful charging decisions.'"
Cassidy argues that mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent
offenses should be repealed because they are costly, compel guilty pleas,
encourage recidivism, and are implemented in a racially discriminatory
way. 145 His arguments are persuasive, and his suggestion that
prosecutors join the advocacy movement in their role as administers of
justice is an important one. Prosecutors are uniquely situated to persuade
legislators of the ineffectiveness and unfairness of these laws.
Cassidy's second proposal is not as persuasive. He acknowledges
that the fight to end mandatory minimum sentences will be difficult and
argues that in the meantime, prosecutors should implement and publish
guidelines that would govern when line prosecutors might dismiss or
reduce charges that carry mandatory minimums. 146 Prosecutors would be
required to submit requests to reduce or dismiss these charges to a
review committee. 47 The goal of this internal regulation would be to
4
assure the fair and equitable exercise of discretion. 1
Cassidy's guidelines proposal, if implemented consistently, might
result in a more equitable process, but it is difficult to see how it would
reduce mandatory minimum sentences. He argues that requiring
prosecutors to go through a committee and get permission to reduce or
dismiss mandatory charges would encourage them to be more thoughtful
at the charging stage of the process. 49 In other words, if prosecutors
knew that they would be required to go through this process to reduce or
dismiss these charges, they would be more restrained in bringing them in
the first place. This argument is speculative at best, and the proposal is
quite a circuitous route to more reasonable charging decisions. In light of
Pfaff's research revealing the impact of prosecutors' felony charging
decisions on the prison population, 5 ° more direct and impactful action
by prosecutors is necessary.

143.

Id.at 999.

144.

Id. at 1010-11.

145.
146.

Id. at 997-1010.
Id. at 1013.

147.

Id.

148. Id. at 1013-14 (predicting that this practice will make prosecutors think twice before
charging a crime with a mandatory minimum sentence because they will have to seek approval from
the reviewing committee to dismiss the case).
149. Id. at 1014.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32.
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A prosecutor has an ethical duty to seek justice and improve and
reform the administration of the criminal justice system. That duty could
be fulfilled by working to reduce mass incarceration through the
expanded use of diversion and clemency programs. These two proposals
could bring about a direct and substantial reduction in the prison
population without posting a threat to public safety.
A.

Expanded Use of Diversion

State prosecutors should expand existing diversion programs to
include all misdemeanors and all nonviolent felonies.15 1 Currently, most
prosecutor offices have diversion programs for first-time offenders
charged with minor misdemeanors.152 These diversion programs offer
defendants the opportunity to have their charges dismissed if they meet
certain conditions within a certain time period.153 For example, they
might be required to complete a drug or alcohol program, do community
service, pay restitution, or enroll in an education or employment
program. 15 4 Upon successful completion of the program or other
conditions, the prosecutor dismisses the charges. 55 These diversion
programs are very beneficial in that the defendant avoids a criminal
conviction and all its collateral consequences. Most prosecutor offices,
however, only offer diversion for very minor offenses (possession of
marijuana, petty theft, littering, etc.).156 These programs have been in
existence for decades.157 Their continued use serves an important
purpose but they do not address the crisis of mass incarceration.
Since about half of all prisoners are serving time for nonviolent
offenses, expanding diversion programs to include this category of
offenses would significantly reduce the number of people going to
prison.15 The devastating effects and financial and human costs of mass
151. Although this article addresses the implementation of these proposals on the state level,
they could be implemented on the federal level as well.
152. See A National Survey of Criminal Justice Diversion Programs and Initiatives, CTR.
FOR HEALTH & JUST. 17, 20-21, 28 (Dec. 2013), http://www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/sites/
www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/files/publications/CHJ%20Diversion%/2OReport_web.pdf.
153. See id at 17.
154. See, e.g., id at 25 (listing the requirements of Vermont's diversion program).
155. Id. at 20, 23 ("Successful completion results in a dismissal or reduction of charges.").
156. Id. at28.
157. See id at 17.
158. See John Pfaff, For True Penal Reform, Focus on the Violent Offenders, WASH.
POST (July 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/for-true-penal-reform-focus-onthe-violent-offenders/2015/07/26/1340ad4c-3208-Ile5-97ae-3a3Occa95d7-story.htm
(quoting a
"key point" in a speech by President Obama, Pfaff provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]ver the last
few decades, we've also locked up more and more nonviolent drug offenders than ever before, for
longer than ever before," which "is the real reason our prison population is so high").
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incarceration demand a comprehensive, impactful solution. Prosecutors
should implement policies that result in a term of imprisonment for those
who threaten the safety of others, while seeking alternatives to
incarceration for others who break the law.
Every defendant charged with a misdemeanor or nonviolent felony
would not receive diversion. Prosecutors would set eligibility criteria
and conditions that would have to be fulfilled before the case is
dismissed. For example, it would be reasonable to exclude defendants
with a violent criminal record or extensive criminal history. However,
restricting the programs to first offenders only may not be reasonable,
especially when one considers the effects of previous arrest and charging
policies, racial profiling, and other practices. Once criteria are set,
participants would be required to fulfill conditions based on
individualized assessments. For example, defendants with substance
abuse problems would be required to complete rehabilitative programs.
Those with education or mental health needs would complete
appropriate programs. Defendants charged with theft or other property
crimes might be required to make restitution to their victims or do some
form of community service. Defendants who fail to meet the required
conditions would be discharged from the program and prosecuted in
accordance with normal office policies.
Some prosecutor offices offer diversion to individuals charged with
felonies, but the requirements are usually very restrictive.159 One
prosecutor, who has successfully used diversion in a wide range of
felony cases, is John Chisholm, the District Attorney for Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin.6 Chisholm implemented an early intervention
program that results in either dismissal or reduction of charges for those
who successfully comply with prescribed conditions.16 1 Chisholm does
not offer the program to defendants charged with very violent offenses,

159. See Daniel Hurst, Pretrial Diversion in Kentucky, HURST & HURST (Mar. 4,
2014), http://www.hurstandhurstlaw.com/pretrial-diversion-in-kentucky (citing the requirements of
the diversion programs for Class D felonies in Kentucky, which excludes offenders who
have received a felony conviction or have been put on probation in ten years prior to the
offense); see also Felony Pre-Trial Intervention, ST. ATTY's OFFICE FLA. (May 26, 2016),
http://saol7.state.fl.us/felony-pti.html (explaining that, in Florida, a first-time, third-degree felony
offender can qualify for this program); Mark Mitchell, The Choice Is Yours: An Innovative
Alternative-to-IncarcerationProgram in Philadelphia,PHILA. SOC. INNOVATIONS J. (Sept. 2011),
http://philasocialinnovations.org/joumal/articles/featured-social-innovations/405-the-mary-howardhealth-center-meeting-the-health-care-needs-of-the-chronically-homeless-in-phiadephia-sp-3199?
showall=&limitstart (explaining a program that bases eligibility on age, violent offenses in historical
or present charges, arrest history, and outstanding warrants).
160. Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment, NEW YORKER, May 11, 2015, at 24, 24-25.
161. ld.at28.

20

Davis: The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration

2016]

THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL DUTY

but it is not restricted to misdemeanor offenders. 162 Eligibility is
determined by a detailed assessment of each defendant that includes an
examination of his criminal record, background, lifestyle, and other
relevant factors.163 Individuals admitted to the program are closely
supervised and required to participate in programs that address their
individual needs."6 Chisholm's efforts have resulted in a significant
reduction in misdemeanor prosecutions.' 65
B. Supportfor Clemency Programs
The President of the United States and the governors of each state
have the power to grant clemency to prisoners. 6 6 There are different
forms of clemency. A pardon involves restoration of an offender's civil
rights, such as the right to vote. 167 A commutation of a sentence involves
reducing the term of a sentence-to either time served or some reduced
amount of time.168 A commutation does not remove a conviction from a
69
person's record. 1
Expanded use of diversion is a forward looking policy with the
potential to reduce the number of individuals going to prison, but
diversion cannot provide relief for the thousands of prisoners currently
serving excessive prison sentences. Any effort to achieve a meaningful
reduction of the current prison population should involve clemency in
appropriate cases. President Obama has used his clemency power to
release a small number of nonviolent offenders who had already served
many years of their excessive sentences, but the criteria for clemency
established by the Justice Department excludes a significant number of
federal prisoners who may deserve clemency.7 0 For example, priority
consideration is given only to prisoners who have been convicted of

162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 32 (explaining that Chisholm's program resulted in prosecutions dropping from nine
hundred thousand to fifty-two hundred).
166. Kaye Foley, Executive Clemency Explained, YAHOO! (July 17, 2015), https://www.
yahoo.com/katiecouric/executive-clemency-commutations-pardons-on-july- 124350231873.html;
Daniel Engber, How Does a Governor Grant Clemency?, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2005, 6:08 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/explainer/2005/1 1/how does agovemor grant cl
emency.html.
167. Foley, supranote 166.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Matt Ford, The Limits of Obama's Clemency, ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2014),
http://www.theattantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/the-limits-of-obama-mercy/383870.
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low-level, nonviolent offenses and who have already served at least ten
years in prison.' 7
Many prisoners serving excessive sentences are nonviolent
offenders, but over half of current state prisoners are serving time
for violent offenses,' 72 and some do not pose a danger to society.
For example, there are some offenses that are technically categorized
as violent offenses that do not involve violent behavior. Unarmed
burglary is classified as a violent crime in some jurisdictions even
though the crime does not involve physical harm or danger to
another person.' 73 In addition, there may be prisoners who were
convicted of violent offenses but did not engage in violent behavior,
such as an accomplice to a robbery who acted as a lookout. Finally,
even individuals who were directly involved in a violent crime may
no longer pose a threat because they are elderly or ill or because
they have served a substantial period of time in prison with
an exceptional record demonstrating that they are rehabilitated.
Clemency should not be limited to individuals convicted of low-level,
nonviolent offenses.
Prosecutors should establish clemency units in their offices to
support clemency for prisoners convicted of nonviolent offenses and for
prisoners convicted of violent offenses who have demonstrated they do
not pose a danger to society. Prosecutors should become advocates for
an expanded use of the clemency power, including direct advocacy with
governors. They should support reasonable criteria for commutations
and pardons, and the process should involve individual assessments
of prisoners rather than automatically excluding large categories of
prisoners based solely on the offense. Factors to consider should include
the nature of the offense, the extent of the prisoner's involvement in
the crime, his criminal record, his behavior in prison, and other
relevant factors.

171.

See Clemency Initiative, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-

initiative (last visited July 24, 2016) (listing factors that make a person eligible for clemency).
172. See Pfaff, supra note 159 (finding that, since 1990, sixty,, percent of state prison
populations has come from locking up violent offenders, as opposed to seventeen percent who are
serving time for nonviolent drug offenses).
173. See RICHARD F. CULP ET AL., Is BURGLARY A CRIME OF VIOLENCE? AN ANALYSIS
OF NATIONAL DATA 1998-2007, at 55-56 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/
248651.pdf (finding that California, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina apply the classification of
aggravated burglaries not based on being armed or causing injury but solely on structure type and
occupancy).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

As ministers of justice, prosecutors have an ethical duty to take
action to correct injustices in the criminal justice system.17 4 There is no
greater injustice than the excessive and unwarranted incarceration of
millions of individuals that has produced the crisis of mass incarceration
in the United States. Prosecutors have the power and discretion to
implement practices and policies that can reduce the prison population in
significant ways, namely by expanding the use of diversion and
supporting a more expansive use of the clemency power. Prosecutors
have played a significant role in creating the crisis of mass incarceration,
and they have an ethical duty to do whatever they can to fix it.

174.

See supra Part V.
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